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Introduction
The microfinance industry is now in its third
decade of growth. It is a substantial component of
development efforts in most developing countries
and also now in Central and Eastern Europe and the
Newly Independent States (Forster et al. 2003)
where it is expanding rapidly. During this growth
period there has been ever-increasing attention to
the modalities through which microfinance service
provision seeks to contribute to the achievement of
development objectives. Two routes1 receive most
attention. The first is the contribution to poverty
reduction through ensuring service delivery to poor
households that have the capacity to strengthen
their livelihoods, but have lacked the financial
resources to realise that potential. This does not
usually mean an exclusive focus on targeting
households that are poor, though it may, but it does
mean active programming to ensure inclusion of the
poor. The second is the contribution to the
establishment of functional financial markets,
particularly in rural areas for households that were
previously without proper access to financial
services. To simplify, we can refer to the former as
the poverty route and the latter as the market route.
The core issue facing the industry today is how
microfinance organisations (MFOs) can combine
these routes. Few within the industry would
disagree that both are desirable but the poverty
route, through targeting and organisational learning
to improve poverty outreach, has financial costs and
there is a trade-off between the two courses.
Quantifying these costs and the associated welfare
benefits is a key industry challenge.
Most MFOs have a mission commitment to the
poverty route. However, they are facing increasing
pressure to perform as well on the market route.
The pressure is threefold: first, they need to grow
in order to achieve a scale of outreach that makes a
significant difference to poverty;2 secondly, only
through growing will they achieve the operational
scale economies that allow them to be financially
sustainable; thirdly, donor money is limited and to
grow they need to access commercial funds. The
very fact of this pressure of course encourages
survival-minded MFOs to pay more attention to
the market route.
At present we only have agreed indicators that
measure performance on the market route.IDS Bulletin Vol 34 No 4 2003
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Through services such as the Microbanking Bulletin
and rating systems such as GIRAFE and CAMEL,3
the quality, i.e. the commercial viability, of an MFO
portfolio can be assessed. On the poverty route,
relatively few MFOs (Sebstad and Cohen 2000) can
convincingly demonstrate their poverty-reduction
performance through gathering information on
household-level selection for, and then impact of,
service provision.4 However, there is a growing
commitment to correct this. Some MFOs,
including Imp-Act partners, are monitoring both
selection and impact. Their experience provides
the basis for establishing industry standards on
poverty reduction performance. Crucially, such
standards must incorporate two central concerns: a
measurable and comparable concept of poverty
and a clear understanding of how the operational
context imposes trade-off costs between market
performance and poverty performance.
The adoption of poverty performance standards is
necessary if donors and other “double bottom
line”5 investors are to be confident of fulfilling their
mandate on poverty reduction. Performance
against such standards should be not assessed as a
“pass or fail”. Experience shows that MFOs which
are able to perform on the poverty route and be
credible with their performance on the market
route have gone through a process of learning. The
MFOs describing their experience in this section of
the Bulletin are examples of this learning in very
different contexts. Building on such experience,
assessment should be based both on performance
and on evidence of an organisational culture that
promotes improving practice responsive to
information about context and clients. This agenda
can identify what Zeller and Meyer (2002: 377)6
refer to as ‘public goods… institutional prototypes
for specific socioeconomic and agroecological
settings that can be replicated and adapted by other
financial institutions’.
1. Financial sustainability and
poverty reduction: two stories
about the birth and growth of
microfinance
Both the market and poverty routes for MFOs are
very widely supported but there are major
differences in emphasis between the two amongst
different analysts. To a large extent these reflect
difference in perception about the problem that
MFOs are seeking to address. These perceptions
have historic roots as described in the two “stories”
below.
1.1 A story about market failure
The foundations of today’s microfinance industry
in developing countries were laid in the analyses of
rural financial market failure in the early days of
development. This was a commercial supply
failure, repeated in many countries, characterised
by public provision, subsidy, ineffective targeting
and client default. Transactions costs theory and
the paradigm of imperfect information (Hoff and
Stiglitz 1990) led to the understanding that failure
was due to problems of screening potential
borrowers, borrower incentives to repay and lender
enforcement of contracts.
Students of microfinance will be familiar with this
analysis of the failure of rural financial markets.
Many more will have read of or heard about the
origins of Grameen Bank, the most famous pioneer
of microfinance. Professor Yunus, the founder of
Grameen Bank, started by lending money to poor
women near his university campus. They had skills
to produce simple goods and ready markets but
insufficient money to buy essential raw materials.
The loans he made were useful and were repaid.
From these simple origins Grameen grew through
a series of project stages to its status today, two and
a half decades later, as a commercially solvent
lender to over two million predominantly female
borrowers in Bangladesh. Many studies have
examined the ways in which Grameen’s service
design addressed the problems of screening,
incentives and enforcement which had led to past
failure. The model has been replicated globally.
Other, neglected models of service provision –
cooperatives, Rolling Savings and Credit
Associations (ROSCAs), Self-Help Groups (SHGs),
village banks, credit unions – have also multiplied.
This growth of microfinance institutions has been
fuelled by international donor support. A key
concern in the provision of this support has been the
long-term financial sustainability of the institutions
supported. Financial standards have been
established and they are used to assess performance.
A core judgement underlying this approach is the
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very reasonable view that donor funds are neither
inexhaustible nor free. According to this view, MFOs
should aspire to become self-sufficient or to access
commercial sources of funds and their success in
doing so will itself be evidence of their viability.
As new entrants to the sector provide competition
for the pioneers there is more pressure to pay
attention to operational efficiency. Countries which
have led the way, notably Bolivia and Bangladesh,
have the best documented examples of competitive
environments and the implications for both
borrowers and lenders. This has reinforced the
pressure for MFOs to be flexible learning
institutions, responsive to the imperatives of
financial sustainability. Bankers in particular,
understandably, take a fairly robust view of the
need to prioritise financial sustainability. The future
success of microfinance will depend on
commercialisation. There is a second story though.
1.2 A story about poverty reduction
By the 1970s, analysis of poverty was demonstrating
that many poor people, especially rural women, had
received little benefit from a rural development
agenda that has invested heavily in community
development, and in agriculture. The results have
been at best mixed and the numbers of poor people
have increased. The failure has many causes but the
inability to provide secure livelihoods at reasonable
levels of living has been the most visible and
fundamental reason. With the development of
microfinance, targeted programmes can resource
self-employment and small enterprise development
which can enable poor people to provide their own
livelihoods. Poor people have skills and a capacity to
produce for the market but have lacked access to
financial services. They have faced usurious interest
rates and have had to deal with interlinked markets
in ways which reduce their earnings.
Microfinance is not a panacea but improved access
to financial services is a core need for the poor –
markets have failed them. Very often though,
financial services must be complemented by other
forms of service provision and in the absence of
these, microfinance may not be as effective as it
could otherwise be. Such service provision may
include support for markets, both input and
output markets related to small and cottage
industries, and support for the development of
human and social assets.7
The poverty agenda was not supported by much of
the theoretical analysis, outlined above, which
focused on the financial market dimensions of
service provision8 and ignored assessment of the
need for inclusive programming, targeting
instruments or complementary inputs. Essentially,
it made the locus of analysis the problem of
financial market failure, not failure of poverty
reduction policy. Very often there was an implicit
presumption that simple correction of market
failure would lead to access at least for those
deserving of credit: “rural” lending became
synonymous with “poverty reduction” lending.
Extraordinarily, some commentators would argue
(Robinson 2001) that for very poor households
credit was not a suitable service. This was based on
experience of existing service providers and not on
an analysis of poverty-reduction needs for the very
poor. Moreover, as many studies have
demonstrated, microfinance service provision has
impacts at household-level and beyond, other than
income benefits to loanees. These issues fall away
when the focus is on commercialisation.
In effect, the poverty reduction agenda has been
taken over to a large extent by the excessive focus
on financial sustainability. Many NGOs turned
MFOs have prioritised microfinance operations
and have suffered from mission drift, from
compassion to capitalism (Greeley 1997), as they
seek survival in a commercialising microfinance
world.
1.3 A synthesis?
The two stories reflect two different approaches to
current analysis of the microfinance industry. The
exact contours of this debate have obviously varied
according to context, the whims of stakeholders,
especially donors, and who is doing the debating.
Neither is false or wrong, nobody thinks poverty
reduction is not an important objective or that we
can ignore financial sustainability of institutions
serving the poor. Moreover, advocates of both
perspectives do have a shared recognition that
supply-led approaches to product design are not
likely to be sustainable.9 Understanding client
needs has become a clarion call in today’s industry
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and market research tools, capacity for institutional
learning and responsiveness to client needs are a
shared agenda. The Grameen Bank itself has gone
through a process10 of re-engineering.
Despite such common agendas though, they do
reflect rather different positions on the way in
which microfinance might or should evolve. Major
recent publications, such as The Commercialization
of Microfinance (Drake and Rhyne 2002) have
accepted that commercialisation is the way forward
and focus on the implications of that for the
industry. On the other side, publications such as
Pathways Out of Poverty (Daley-Harris 2002) have
detailed the achievements of MFOs in reaching the
poor sustainably and have addressed what further
needs to be done.
These debates within the microfinance industry
reflect older and broader, more clearly ideological
debates, about the development agenda and the
pattern of growth. Dudley Seers, one of the
intellectual founding fathers of development
studies, wrote a seminal article in 1972 with the
title, ‘What are we trying to measure?’. He was
referring to the relationship between national
economic growth and poverty reduction and
inquiring into the significance of the specific
pattern of growth. Since then we have seen a long
period, sometimes referred to as the “lost era” of
development, in which market-based solutions
were prioritised. The recent debates, associated
particularly with an article by Dollar and Kraay
(2000), around the evidence on income
distribution and growth, testify to the heat of the
continuing controversy on development
orthodoxy. It has been fuelled by strengthening
international public policy commitment to poverty
reduction. Today, there is a stronger focus on the
direct implications of development policy for
poverty reduction.11 We use the term “pro-poor
growth” (White and Anderson 2001), not without
disagreement on the precise definition, to describe
a pattern of economic development that at least
benefits poor households as much as any other
group. This focus may not be due to some new-
found altruism but be based on the need for
development of markets and for freedom from
conflict. However, it has meant that the poverty-
reduction credentials of development interventions
are subject to detailed scrutiny. These interventions
are often mobilised around core initiatives such as
the Poverty Reduction Strategy papers and the
pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). Inevitably, support for microfinance will
also be increasingly subject to more stringent
criteria on poverty reduction.12 The key lesson from
this broader debate is that the pattern of growth
does matter and the microfinance industry must be
able to demonstrate that the development benefits
it provides actively contribute to poverty
reduction.
2. Context and trade-off costs
In an important contribution to the debate on
growth and poverty reduction discussed above,
Martin Ravallion (2001), has argued for ‘looking
beyond the averages’ when assessing the Dollar and
Kraay result that, on global cross-country evidence,
income growth of the lowest income quintile
moves one to one with average income growth. To
point out that these gains are one for one on
average hides the fact that in about half the country
cases the lowest income quintile grew less than the
average, even in countries which scored well on
policy reforms. The reasons are not our focus here,
but in part, they are to do with inequality in the
distribution of human and physical assets. They
do, however, drive home a core message for MFOs
that, whilst dealing with financial market failure
should promote growth, it may not promote
poverty reduction. Ravallion’s underlying point is
that context matters. Understanding how to
achieve poverty reduction through growth is
properly the subject of country-specific micro-
research. Likewise, there is no global prescription
for achieving poverty reduction through
microfinance service provision.
Specifically, the costs of achieving any level of
poverty outreach will have different implications
for the achievement of financial sustainability in
different contexts. The three case studies in this
section illustrate this important point very well and
highlight two domains of difference. The nature of
poverty in each area is one crucial distinction; the
costs of addressing it, given context, are the other.
In each case, there is a commitment to
organisational learning in order to strengthen
impact on poverty. In each case, the analysis led to
quite different solutions. What they have in
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common is a commitment to improving social
performance through the more effective inclusion
of the poor.
The BRAC study in Bangladesh describes their
analysis of targeting and impact for their main
programme with over two million members and
describes a new programme for reaching the ultra-
poor. BRAC was already operating a sustainable
programme that was fairly effectively targeted on
those in absolute poverty but, as is also reported
widely elsewhere in the industry, was not initially13
very effective in reaching the ultra-poor. BRAC
studies have a sophisticated analysis of poverty
(Halder and Husain 2001), developing around ten
different categories of poor households beneath the
poverty line. It is clear that they have been very
successful in reaching many poor people
sustainably but for some groups special measures
are required and a new programme was developed
– Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction.
This programme operates independently of the
main microfinance programme and beneficiaries
from it may graduate to membership of the main
programme. In addition, BRAC has several other
programmes in health, education and the
productive and financial sectors which allow it to
address multiple dimensions of poverty as well as
different categories of poor people. BRAC is large
and has a complex structure but the core lesson
from its operations is the innovative way it has
responded to knowledge gained from analysis of
different experiences and dimensions of poverty,
and its continual review of its programme impact.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prizma focused on
three areas – leadership, culture and incentives – to
develop a structure that was able to offer products
more suitable to the needs of poor borrowers. They
uncovered that reasons for limited inclusion of the
poor and their high drop-out rate were linked to
high initial loan size, the institutional incentives to
promote larger repeat loans and the too stringent
collateral requirements. By addressing these
concerns they reduced both programme exclusion
and self-exclusion of the poor. The change in
incentives also involved a relaxation of loan
delinquency measures used in staff incentive
systems, and the promotion of client assessment by
branch staff to determine underlying reasons for
drop-out and for delinquency. These changes,
apparently involving higher costs, were in fact
accommodated without loss of financial
sustainability. The key steps to achieving this were
the changes in incentives that promoted efficient
performance by branch staff in ways that benefited
the poor and, crucially, a reduction in drop-out
rates which were very costly for profitable financial
performance.
In the case of the Small Enterprise Foundation
(SEF)14 in South Africa, the development of a new
programme targeted exclusively to the poorest was
based on analysis of exclusion associated with their
main microcredit programme. They had found that
small loan size did not deter non-poor borrowers
and that there was a strong sense for the very poor
that the main programme, with such membership,
was not for them. SEF started a new programme
that targeted exclusively in order to overcome these
problems. In addition to targeting, they provided
staff support for motivation, business planning and
on-going business support.
These were three quite different responses: one
involved a new programme aimed at graduating
potential microfinance members, one incorporated
stronger social performance through organisational
change and one involved a parallel programme. In
all three cases, there was some real or potential
sacrifice on financial performance. With BRAC it
was radical, involving the development of a new
grant-based programme.With Prizma, it involved a
series of organisational changes, including a
relaxation of delinquency criteria allowing better
access to the poor. In the case of SEF, a parallel
more staff-intensive programme was developed
that used targeting instruments to exclude all but
the poorest; it has a longer time period before self-
sufficiency can be achieved, compared to SEF’s
original microcredit programme. In each case, the
development was based on detailed local analysis
of poverty and the needs of poor people. In all
three cases, the programmes have an enviable
international reputation for commitment to
poverty reduction and for professionalism in
managing their operations. They all recognise that
financial sustainability is only of instrumental
worth given their core values on social
performance and poverty reduction. They also
recognise that they must have a commitment to
institutional efficiency and a growth agenda which
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will allow their members eventually to be part of a
sustainable microfinance programme. They
represent “institutional prototypes” that set
industry markers for MFOs seeking to perform on
the poverty reduction agenda.
The case studies confirm that any form of targeting
involves additional cost.15 The trade-off issue is
real. For an MFO that is working towards
sustainability and also wants to target the very
poor, it is inevitable that the cost recovery interest
rate will be higher, in an accounting sense at least.
To the very poor, the cost of money is higher.
Reflecting on the nature of these costs, two distinct
categories can be identified. First there are the
direct financial market costs. These financial costs
may be as a result of smaller loan sizes, or a riskier
portfolio. They may also be through reputational
costs in the money market if financial viability or
profits are perceived to be a second order priority.
There is a second set of costs that relate to
identification and operational costs.16 These are
distinct in the sense that they apply to targeting per
se, rather than to targeting of financial services.
Perhaps the most authoritative analysis of such
targeting costs is that of Amartya Sen. He identifies
five types of costs:
n Informational distortion: individuals present
themselves as fulfilling the target criteria; 
n Incentive distortion: individuals behave
differently, e.g. reduce their economic activity,
in order to qualify; 
n Disutility and stigma: labeling people as poor
undermines self-respect; 
n Administrative and invasive losses: at a
collection cost to bureaucracies, individuals
have to provide confidential information; 
n Political sustainability and quality: targeting
excludes and the excluded may undermine
programme sustainability through challenging
the basis for targeting. The severity of these
costs is context specific and is a second
important route through which context
determines the nature of the trade-off between
financial sustainability and poverty outreach.
The case studies referred to and presented in the
articles below illustrate how organisational
commitment to learning and efficiency in the
context of poverty performance can greatly reduce
these targeting costs, even to the point where, in
the case of Prizma and BRAC’s main programme,
they are profitable operations. But this will not
always be the case and something else needs to be
done if the programme is to operate. A “market”
response of addressing these two sets of costs
through higher interest rates is an imperfect
solution. First, it is not correct to assume that poor
people’s demand for loans is price elastic; higher
interest rates will exclude some potential
borrowers. Secondly, competition, regulation or
adverse publicity may prevent adoption of a
profitable rate. There are three solutions: cross-
subsidisation from other lending programmes,
grants, or the adoption of performance standards
that value social performance and, specifically
here, performance on poverty reduction. The first
two are essentially short-term. The adoption of
performance standards that allow MFOs to deliver
on their poverty reduction agenda is the real need
today. Such a measure needs to be able to evaluate
two things:
n Poverty performance: to what extent does an
organisation reach the poor and what impact
does it have on their incomes?
n Organisational performance: given context, to
what extent is an organisation cost-effective in
delivering on poverty reduction?
The issue of organisational performance is
reviewed in more detail in the next section of this
Bulletin. The remainder of this article makes some
observations on the difficulties faced by the
industry in developing poverty performance
standards and proposes a way forward.
3. A framework for poverty impact
assessment
Donors and service providers alike have of course
always said that microfinance is for poverty
reduction. In some cases they have proved this
through detailed impact assessment (IA) studies.
More frequently, the claims have not had an
evidence base. There are three main reasons why
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we do not already have a suitable poverty
performance standard.
First, many people are, quite reasonably, confused
over what is meant by the term poverty. This
confusion has deepened as dissatisfaction with
income-based measures has hardened and
multidimensional definitions have become more or
less universally adopted. The UN Millennium
Summit’s adoption of theMillennium Development
Goals (MDGs) has specifically identified several
other dimensions as agreed targets.17 Secondly,
there is a perception that accurately measuring
outreach is difficult, expensive and time-
consuming to do. Thirdly, there has been little
incentive to assess poverty outreach meaningfully
as it has not been a condition of funding.
To deal with the first, conceptual problem, in the
Imp-Act programme, we identify three main
dimensions in which poverty is addressed. In
examining the poverty “credentials” of clients at
entry and subsequent poverty reduction impact on
clients and their families, we distinguish between
income poverty and all other dimensions affecting
clients. The latter are put together under the
heading of social impacts. These would include
health, education and empowerment benefits,
crucial to the MDGs, as well as other direct welfare
impacts on clients. There is a third dimension of
impact. Recognising that, as the scale of
microfinance programmes grows, there are wider
economic and social impacts, we also need to be
concerned with these wider impacts and their
effects on poverty for both clients and non-clients.
These can be both economic, largely through
market effects, and social, through the influence of
microfinance groups on values, relationships and
practices within communities. In practice, it is
difficult for MFOs, or anybody else, to provide a
rigorous assessment of these wider impacts but in
some circumstance they can be very significant.18
The broader term, “social performance”, can be
used here, and increasingly is being used rather
than “poverty”, to refer to these aspects of MFO
performance.19 This framework provides three
dimensions to social performance: income poverty,
other social impacts on clients, and wider impacts.
By separating out income poverty from social and
wider impacts this framework has the key
advantage that MFOs could reasonably hope that
they do have a positive income effect on their
clients but not all would expect to score in the two
other dimensions of poverty.
Income poverty is objectively measurable and
comparable. These are important characteristics of
a social performance standard. Analysis of other
social impacts and wider impacts can then be used
to address all the other dimensions of poverty as
part of a more context-specific assessment of
organisational performance. In other words when
we refer to poverty performance as a standard we
are adopting a definition that will allow
comparable measurement of performance.
However, we note that this performance is subject
to context and that the context will also determine
what other dimensions of poverty matter as well as
the costs of achieving them. To take an example, in
some contexts, e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
education is not a significant obstacle to livelihood
development especially for the “new poor”, largely
those suffering displacement from the public sector
and having low incomes but possessing assets and
education. In other contexts, e.g. Bangladesh,
absence of education may be a fundamental
obstacle to poor female enterprise development.
Clearly, an MFO that incurred additional costs in
Bangladesh on literacy or numeracy programmes
that allowed borrowers to use loans more
effectively would be adding important “social
value” in that context. This would not be relevant
for the “new poor” of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Nonetheless, in both cases we would want to know
whether the beneficiaries are poor by some
comparable measure. The measure we propose is
an income measure, and as outlined below, this
would have both a relative and an absolute
dimension. This would be a constant and relevant
for all assessments of poverty and social
performance. Performance on this measure
depends on context and the two types of trade-off
or targeting cost distinguished above. In assessing
the effectiveness of MFO performance in meeting
these costs, their contribution on the two other
dimensions of poverty are incorporated.
Necessarily, the latter two domains are potentially
very diverse and not really amenable to a
comprehensive ex ante categorisation since there
will always be the unanticipated consequences of
service delivery to accommodate.
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Some service providers will be sensitive to their
effects in all three poverty domains. But most
service providers have little knowledge of their
impact in any of these domains. This Bulletin
examines some of the ways in which MFOs can
develop knowledge of their impact in these
dimensions. This knowledge has to be useful
knowledge. It has to be able to serve the
organisational learning needs of service providers.
In developing this agenda, the Bulletin addresses
the second reason why poverty outreach
assessments have been neglected by showing that,
with proper structures and incentives, it need not
be difficult, expensive or time-consuming to
provide this knowledge. Such knowledge also has
to be accessible to and verifiable by donors and
others engaged in the industry.20 Only then can it
function as an industry benchmark to allow
comparative assessment of MFO performance.
Once this hurdle is crossed then MFOs can be
given incentives, in the form of performance
against benchmarks, to perform on poverty. Of
course, some MFOs will feel threatened by new
standards but it is really only an attempt to codify
what most claim to be doing anyway. MFOs that
choose to ignore such standards may instead
pursue purely commercial routes for funding and
we are likely to see a division of this sort emerging.
The framework addresses the problem of
‘Comparing Apples to Oranges’ as Nègre and
Maguire (2002) so aptly put it in discussing the use
of financial ratings to assess MFOs with: different
accounting standards; different funding sources
(costs); different scales linked to their relative age;
differing environmental factors (they identify seven
dimensions); and different target clientele. It does
so by being explicit about context-specific
opportunities and costs in delivering on all
dimensions of poverty. By explicitly allowing for
poverty reduction performance in each of these
three dimensions the framework can for example
accommodate programmes which work with poor
communities, without targeting, and focus on the
second dimension primarily. Likewise, MFOs with
mixed or non-targeted clientele may perform well
on wider impacts, e.g. through employment
generation, and use that domain to demonstrate
poverty reduction performance. Performance on
these dimensions is used to assess the context-
specific cost-effectiveness of a service provider.
Acknowledging but separating out these different
dimensions allows us to be more specific about
some of the differences between advocates of
financial sustainability and advocates of poverty
focus. It provides two focal points: one which
explicitly assesses the welfare effects of direct
financial benefits to financial service provision; the
second which assesses other welfare effects and the
overall cost-effectiveness of the organisation.
The income-poverty measure is used for assessing
both outreach and impact. It is objective and has
two components.
n A relative measure: Poverty outreach should be
assessed on coverage relative to the distribution
of poverty in the geographic area of programme
coverage and not on the MFO portfolio alone.
Failure to adopt this approach means we know
nothing about who is excluded.
n An absolute measure: Poverty outreach must
be assessed in ways which are nationally and
internationally comparable. This requires
comparison with national poverty lines and the
international measure of $1 a day. Once you
can make the domestic comparison, the
international comparison is possible through
secondary data. It is expensive to reproduce
national poverty estimates based on income or
consumption and very expensive to do well.
Instead, we should use poverty correlates.
These will vary nationally and locally but food
insecurity, occupation, wages or asset measures
such as housing quality may be relevant in
specific circumstances. Consultative Group to
Assist the Poorest (CGAP) has worked with
Imp-Act partners and others and has widely
tested a relative poverty tool. The work with
Imp-Act partners is now focused on developing
correlates (sometimes called proxies) from this
analysis that allow comparisons with absolute
poverty measures.
The organisational performance measure is a
context-specific impact tool and incorporates both
performance on social and wider impacts and cost-
effectiveness in addressing these and the income-
poverty criterion. It examines the extent to which
an organisational poverty embraces culture
reduction and financial sustainability as core
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values. Recognising that there is a trade-off, MFOs
need to be able to demonstrate that their
leadership, their structure and their incentives are
driven by these joint concerns. What we need is a
financial measure – we have plenty – combined
with an efficiency measure that assesses how well
an organisation translates these twin goals into
effective service delivery. Whilst there will be a
subjective element to this assessment, the tools to
provide a degree of rigour are partially available
from the social policy and the management
literature and are being applied by MFOs, as Parts
II and III of this Bulletin describe.
4. Conclusion: setting standards
In 1998, one of the foremost authorities on the
microfinance industry wrote of the ‘continuing split
between those in the poverty camp and those in the
sustainability camp’ (Rhyne 1998). The conflict
then centred on the legitimacy of a development
agenda that focused on financial sustainability but
did so in the name of poverty reduction.
Five years on, a great deal has changed. Consonant
with the increasing focus on effective use of
International Development Assistance for poverty
reduction, the microfinance industry is under
pressure to prove its focus on reaching the poor.
Microfinance networks such as ACCION,21
CASHPOR,22 Opportunity International, PlaNet
Finance and SEEP23 are now paying attention to the
assessment of poverty outreach. Major
international partners such as Freedom From
Hunger (FFH) and Plan International are working
on the development of impact assessment tools
that address specific dimensions of poverty
outreach. CGAP has developed and implemented a
relative poverty-targeting tool and is now
synthesising this approach with absolute poverty
measures. The second Microcredit Summit (New
York, November 2002) renewed the focus on
poverty outreach in its flagship publication (Daley-
Harris 2002). CGAP has been involved in
developing social performance indicators linked to
the MDGs to reflect the double bottom line in
microfinance. Building on these initiatives, the
strategic task for the industry now is to develop a
common practical basis for accurately assessing
poverty outreach performance of microfinance
service providers.
This article has reviewed these developments and
proposed that this assessment has two components
– poverty performance and organisational
performance. Global development objectives
determine the former; differences in local context
require the latter.
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Notes
1. Microfinance also has a key social protection
function in many settings where it helps meet
immediate consumption needs. It has a core role in
specific sectoral settings, such as small enterprise
development, and sometimes has been part of a
broader development agenda focused on social
mobilisation.
2. Though we should note evidence from Woller and
Schreiner (2003) that programme scale was not
linked to financial sustainability of village banks they
studied and that, as other studies had shown,
interest rates and relative salary levels were the only
significant determinants of financial sustainability.
3. GIRAFE (Governance, Information, Risk, Funding,
and Efficiency) is the acronym of a rating system
developed by PlaNet Finance; CAMEL (Capital
adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and
Liquidity management) is an acronym of a rating
system developed by ACCION (CGAP 2001).
4. Hulme (2000) presents an overview of the
methodological problems faced in assessing impact
and why it is difficult to infer attribution.
5. The “double bottom line” accounts for both financial
and social value; there are variants around this
including “triple bottom line” accounting which
(normally) adds environmental costs and benefits as
well.
6. These authors also emphasise the importance of
public policy and public investment in creating an
appropriate environment for such public goods to
emerge. See Lapenu 2002: 297–320 on the role of
the state.
7. Dunford (2002) provides an informed discussion of
linked, parallel and unified models of service
provision and the “economies of scope”.
8. For example, analysis of how social collateral, peer
monitoring and joint-liability can simultaneously
address the problems respectively, of screening,
incentives and enforcement.
9. In particular, the identification of a need for
insurance and savings products as well as different
loan products has been a significant development
from this demand-led perspective.
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10. See the description of the Grameen Generalised
system and the processes that led to it (Yunus 2002).
11. Development ministries and agencies are being
asked for evidence of their delivery against poverty
reduction objectives much as ministries supporting
services such as health and education in the
developed countries have to demonstrate value for
money against agreed objectives.
12. The US President signed legislation on 17 June 2003
mandating at least half of US support for
microenterprise development to be targeted to the
very poor; i.e. those living on below $1 a day
purchasing power parity income or below half of the
national poverty line income.
13. According to Khandker (2003) there has been a
measured increase in participation of the ultra-poor
in BRAC’s main programme and other Bangladesh
MFOs from 33% in 1991–2 to 58% in 1998–9.
14. See also van de Ruit and May (article 2, this Bulletin)
and Roper (article 7, this Bulletin) on organisational
performance.
15. Though, it is very important to note also that
methods of targeting, e.g. participatory wealth
ranking, may result in additional knowledge, for
borrowers and lenders, which result in better
products, ease of start-up etc. The net effect may well
be cost-savings.
16. These of course are also financial costs but they are
distinct from financial market costs in that they do
not relate directly to portfolio performance or access
to capital.
17. CGAP are in the process of developing social
performance indicators for MFOs that assess
progress to the MDGs. The framework proposed
here is entirely consistent with that initiative.
18. For example, it seems reasonable to conjecture that
the eight million plus borrowers from MFOs in
Bangladesh have indeed had some collective social
and economic impact on markets or values or other
dimensions affecting well-being.
19. Social performance is used more loosely in other
contexts to refer to any aspect of social impact not
just that on poverty 
20. It is anticipated that donors or other social or double
bottom line investors planning substantial
investment would support the development of MFO
capability on these standards in ways that serve
organisational learning. There is already a great deal
known in developing countries about income
poverty measurement and advocates of double
bottom line assessment, largely US in origin, have a
great deal to learn from this expertise.
21. ACCION is a non-profit organisation that fights
poverty through micro-lending. ACCION partners
withMFOs throughout Latin America, Africa and the
USA.
22. CASHPOR (Credit and Savings for the Hard-Core
Poor of Asia-Pacific) is an association of Grameen
bank replications in Asia.
23. SEEP (Small Enterprise Education and Promotion
Network), based in Washington, is an association of
more than 51 North American private and voluntary
organisations which support micro and small
enterprise programmes in the developing world. Its
mission is to advance the practice of these
organisations.
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